Preventing a Cyber-9/11: How Universal Jurisdiction Could Protect International Aviation in the Digital Age by Ashdown, Laura K
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 
Volume 84 Issue 1 Article 2 
2019 
Preventing a Cyber-9/11: How Universal Jurisdiction Could 
Protect International Aviation in the Digital Age 
Laura K. Ashdown 
BYU Law, schmidtl@byulaw.net 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc 
 Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Laura K. Ashdown, Preventing a Cyber-9/11: How Universal Jurisdiction Could Protect International 
Aviation in the Digital Age, 84 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (2019) 
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol84/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, 
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. 
PREVENTING A CYBER-9/11: HOW UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION COULD PROTECT INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
LAURA K. ASHDOWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
MORE THAN EIGHT MILLION PEOPLE travel on commer-cial flights daily.1 With the rise of modern aircraft and the
development of affordable, low-cost airlines, more people are
flying than ever before.2 But cheaper tickets are not the only
reason air travel is on the rise. Commercial airline passengers
also take comfort in the fact that, statistically, they are safer fly-
ing on a jet than they are driving to the airport.3 In fact, com-
mercial flight remains the safest mode of transportation
worldwide, with 2017 marking the safest year yet for commercial
airline travel.4
* J.D. Candidate, Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School,
2019. The author would like to thank Professor Eric Talbot Jensen at BYU Law
for his constant guidance and support, and for proofreading this Article on a
trans-Atlantic flight. The author would also like to thank her husband and own
commercial airline pilot—Jeff—for answering countless questions and providing
valuable insight from an aviator’s perpsective.
1 New Year’s Day 2014 Marks 100 Years of Commercial Aviation, INT’L AIR TRANS-
PORT ASS’N (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2013-12-
30-01.aspx [https://perma.cc/T9Q5-3XYZ].
2 In 2017, a record breaking “4.1 billion passengers were carried by the avia-
tion industry on scheduled” flights. Continued Passenger Traffic Growth and Robust
Air Cargo Demand in 2017, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www
.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/Continued-passenger-traffic-growth-and-robust-air-
cargo-demand-in-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/2HWE-L4NU].
3 “Every day, approximately 100,000 flights take to the sky and land without
incident.” Safety, INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASS’N (2018), https://www.iata.org/
whatwedo/safety/Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/534P-MMF3]; Gillian
Edevane, ‘Am I Going Down?’ App Tries to Help Anxious Flyers by Telling Them Odds of
Plane Crash, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/what-are-
odds-dying-plane-crash-app-892008 [https://perma.cc/74BN-K7QF].
4 David Shepardson, 2017 Safest Year on Record for Commercial Passenger Air
Travel: Groups, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-avia-
3
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How did the aviation industry accomplish this record safe
year? Years like 2017 happen because the aviation industry con-
stantly evolves and learns from decades of trial and error.5 Sadly,
some of the most important safety lessons in aviation are
learned the hard way.6 Notably, the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 (9/11) shook the world and the aviation industry,
resulting in stricter airport regulations as well as physical
changes to commercial aircraft and cockpit doors.7 But stronger
cockpit doors and confiscated water bottles do not guarantee a
flight’s safety. The last line of defense for any flight’s safety lies
with the pilots operating and controlling the aircraft.8
Every day, the aviation industry relies on commercial pilots to
be prepared to follow procedures, anticipate threats, and solve
problems at a moment’s notice, if need be.9 Before any commer-
cial flight takes off in America, the captain and first officer must
review multiple checklists and conduct safety briefings.10 During
these safety briefings, the captain and first officer discuss any
potential threats to the flight’s safety, ranging from poor
weather to an unruly passenger.11 Because of the lessons learned
on 9/11, pilots also lock the cockpit door before takeoff and
follow strict procedures any time one of the pilots leaves to use
the restroom.12 While these pilots and commercial flight crew
are arguably more prepared to stop a hijacker from physically
tion-safety/2017-safest-year-on-record-for-commercial-passenger-air-travel-groups-
idUSKBN1EQ17L [https://perma.cc/PS74-ELS9].




7 After 9/11, aircraft manufacturers strengthened cockpit doors to withstand a
grenade blast and lock more securely from the inside. Who, What, Why: How are
Cockpit Doors Locked?, BBC MAG. MONITOR (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.bbc
.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-32070528 [https://perma.cc/S4S4-VDM6].
8 Patrick Gontar et al., Are Pilots Prepared for a Cyber-Attack? A Human Factors
Approach to the Experimental Evaluation of Pilots’ Behavior, 69 J. AIR TRANSPORT
MGMT. 26, 27 (2018).
9 See Peter A. Bedell, Career Pilot: Checklists and Discipline, It’s a Checklist, Not a To-
Do List, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.aopa.org/
news-and-media/all-news/2016/december/flight-training-magazine/career-pilot-
checklist [https://perma.cc/WHF9-LBVL].
10 See John Cox, Ask the Captain: Standard Procedure for Starting a Flight, USA




12 Who, What, Why: How are Cockpit Doors Locked?, supra note 7.
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storming the cockpit, the same cannot be said for stopping a
new and far more insidious kind of cockpit invasion. In the digi-
tal age of modern airliners, pilots, the aviation industry, and in-
ternational lawmakers must now face the possibility of a
cyberterrorist hacking and “hijacking” an aircraft cockpit
remotely.
In recent decades, the international aviation community has
started to transition away from relying on traditional air trans-
port systems such as radar and ground-based air traffic control.
With the development and adoption of digital communication
systems and internet-connected aircraft, airlines worldwide may
soon enjoy the advantages of wireless connectivity and more pre-
cise satellite monitoring. However, with these modern benefits
also come the increased potential for malicious attacks from
cyberhackers operating remotely in the shadows of cyberspace.
Though current international aviation treaties like the Beijing
Convention may outlaw cyber hijackings, the Convention and
existing aviation law lack the enforcement power necessary to
hold hacker-terrorists and their host nations accountable. With-
out accountability, there is little to deter cyberterrorists from ex-
ploiting aviation’s technological vulnerabilities. In order to
effectively address these new cyber threats and prevent a poten-
tial cyber 9/11, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and the global community should consider adopting
enforcement mechanisms such as universal jurisdiction to deter
malicious cyber activities. Regardless of the deterrent mecha-
nism, the global aviation industry as well as aviation lawmakers
must implement stronger international standards and practices
that hold malicious actors accountable for cyberattacks against
the aviation industry. Ultimately, lawmakers, organizations, and
private corporations must adapt and work together to meet the
safety needs of an evolving world and aviation industry.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the rise of
cyberattacks and the serious threat they pose to critical infra-
structure systems. It then examines areas of cybersecurity vulner-
abilities in the international aviation community and explains
how advances in aviation infrastructure and technology bring
not only benefits, but also new risks for aviation security. The
first part also includes quotes and studies from the aviation in-
dustry demonstrating just how serious a concern cybersecurity
poses to global aviation. It then concludes by highlighting some
anecdotes of cyberattacks and hacks that are already occurring
in the industry.
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The second part begins by discussing the existing legal frame-
work for international aviation. Part II identifies ICAO, the
United Nations (U.N.) agency responsible for the creation of
our international aviation framework, and then discusses the va-
rious international aviation conventions, treaties, and the
changes made to the law as the aviation industry has evolved.
The second part also examines other key players in the global
aviation community, including organizations like the U.S. Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) and International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA), as well as the influence of private
corporations including Boeing and Airbus. This section will also
examine steps aviation lawmakers and organizations are taking
to address and counter rising cyber threats. The second part
ends by concluding that, despite these efforts, the existing legal
framework and organizations fail to sufficiently address and de-
ter the cyber threats targeting the aviation community.
The third part begins by proposing that ICAO and the global
aviation community should consider adopting universal jurisdic-
tion as an enforcement mechanism to hold cyberterrorists and
potential safe haven host nations accountable. This section will
define universal jurisdiction and discuss its origin and rationale
under customary international law. It will also discuss the history
of universal jurisdiction’s application in the context of piracy, as
well as more recent applications for “heinous” crimes like geno-
cide. The third part will also examine the controversy and limits
of universal jurisdiction. To address and overcome these issues,
it will then examine scholarly arguments made in favor of ex-
panding universal jurisdiction to aircraft hijacking and cyberter-
rorism. This section will include the following arguments: (1)
cyberterrorism and hijacking an aircraft are analogous to piracy
and thus warrant the application of universal jurisdiction; and
(2) the heinousness of a potential cyberattack on an aircraft jus-
tifies the expansion of universal jurisdiction.
This Article concludes by suggesting that international avia-
tion lawmakers, organizations, and the world’s nations consider
expanding universal jurisdiction to apply to malicious cyber ac-
tivities targeting the world’s airlines and industry. Regardless of
the enforcement mechanism, international aviation lawmakers,
organizations, and the world’s nations must implement stronger
international standards that hold malicious actors accountable
for cyberattacks against the aviation industry.
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II. CYBERATTACKS AND CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION COMMUNITY
A. WHAT ARE CYBERATTACKS AND HOW DO THEY THREATEN
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences defines cyberattacks
as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or de-
stroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.”13
Perpetrators of cyberattacks include cyberterrorists,14 hacker
groups or “hacktivists,”15 state-sponsored actors,16 ex-employ-
ees,17 business competitors,18 and even bored mischief-makers.19
When it comes to cyberattacks, most individuals probably think
of a hacker breaking into a financial institution’s database and
stealing valuable information like social security numbers or cus-
tomer lists. However, while theft of information is arguably the
most common crime perpetuated during a cyberattack, not all
cyber actors are concerned with making a profit.20 In recent
years, various actors have also used malicious cyber activities to
13 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW,
AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1
(William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
14 See generally John P. Carlin, Inside the Hunt for the World’s Most Dangerous Ter-
rorist: How a British Hacker Joined ISIS’s Top Ranks and Launched a Deadly Global
Cyber Plot, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2018/11/21/junaid-hussain-most-dangerous-terrorist-cyber-hacking-222643
[https://perma.cc/B4LG-Y8EH].
15 See generally Geneva Sands, What to Know About the Worldwide Hacker Group
‘Anonymous,’ ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/US/world-
wide-hacker-group-anonymous/story?id=37761302 [https://perma.cc/P2W4-
S4WB].
16 See generally Edward McKinley, China Pencil-Tip Spy Chip’s Ultimate Market Risk:
The Profits Built on Big Tech’s Low-Cost Global Supply Chain, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/chinas-cyber-spying-keeps-a-lot-of-us-tech-
ceos-up-at-night.html [https://perma.cc/74LN-UTH2].
17 See generally Salvador Rodriguez & Vibhuti Sharma, Tesla Accuses Former Em-
ployee of Hacking and Transferring Data, REUTERS (June 20, 2018), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-ceo/tesla-accuses-former-employee-of-hacking-and-
transferring-data-idUSKBN1JG2OV [https://perma.cc/E8FL-EAGA].
18 See generally McKinley, supra note 16.
19 See generally Andy Meek, Google Engineer Was So Bored, He Hacked Google, N.Y.
POST (Sept. 4, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/09/04/google-engineer-was-so-
bored-he-hacked-google/ [https://perma.cc/54QM-85G8]; Stephen A. Wood et
al., Aviation and Cybersecurity: An Introduction to the Problem and the Developing Law,
46 BRIEF 38, 38 (Summer 2017).
20 See Wood et al., supra note 19.
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embarrass and harass governments or companies,21 provoke po-
litical or social change,22 and even conduct terrorist activities.23
No matter the purpose or crime, the internet enables criminals
and other actors to further their agenda through remote cyber-
attacks by granting these cyber actors greater anonymity and a
lower rate of detection.24
Even more concerning, a nation’s critical infrastructure pro-
vides an easy target of attack for cyberterrorists hoping to intimi-
date or coerce a government or civilian population.25 Critical
infrastructure means “any system of high importance to the
safety and operation” of a country.26 As these critical systems
have become more and more reliant on computer technology
and the internet, they have also become more vulnerable to ma-
licious cyber activities from opportunistic wrongdoers.27 A na-
tion’s military defense systems, financial services sector,
manufacturing industry, energy facilities, and transportation sys-
tems are all examples of critical infrastructure systems and ser-
vices which, if destroyed or disrupted, could have a debilitating
impact on a nation’s health, safety, and security.28 And while a
cyberattack on any portion of a nation’s critical infrastructure
poses serious threats to a nation’s well-being, a cyberattack on
any nation’s aviation industry could cause worldwide collateral
damage.29 As a globally connected industry responsible for 3.4%
of the global GDP, a cyberattack on the international aviation
21 Laura Jarrett & Evan Perez, Justice Dept. Announces Charges Against North Ko-
rean Programmer for Sony Hack, CNN (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
09/06/politics/doj-sony-hack-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/69DR-
59MY].
22 Jason Murdock, Anonymous vs. Qanon: Hackers Pledge to Take Down Pro-Trump
Conspiracy, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/anonymous-
hacking-collective-threatens-qanon-conspiracy-theorists-1058062 [https://perma
.cc/JMS2-CYLX].
23 Carlin, supra note 14.
24 Nicholas W. Cade, An Adaptive Approach for an Evolving Crime: The Case for an
International Cyber Court and Penal Code, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1139, 1146–47
(2012).
25 Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Counts as a Nation’s Critical Infrastructure?,





29 Hackable at Any Height: Cybersecurity in the Aviation Industry, LONDON CYBER-
SECURITY SOLUTIONS 1, 5 (Apr. 2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56
d0212027d4bded627db544/t/56e00f379f7266ed7f057f97/1457524543915/LCS_
Report_April.pdfpg [https://perma.cc/YQS6-NSCA].
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industry would lead to a devastating impact on the global
economy.30
B. RISING THREAT OF CYBERATTACKS IN
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
Cyberattacks against the aviation industry are on the rise. Just
in the year 2018 alone, one airline reported defending itself
from “hundreds of thousands of [cyber] attacks” against its sys-
tems.31 According to a survey conducted by Price-
waterhouseCoopers in 2015, “85 percent of airline CEOs view
cybersecurity as a significant risk.”32 But executive officers of air-
lines are not the only ones worried about cyber threats. In re-
cent years, national aviation regulators and international
aviation experts have acknowledged serious cyber threats facing
aviation due to the industry’s “reliance on an interconnected
network of electronic systems that [are] a critical component to
everyday operations.”33 The American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics noted that “[a]s one of the most complex and
integrated systems of information and communications technol-
ogy (ICT) in the world, the global aviation system is a potential
target for a large-scale cyber attack.”34
1. Areas of Vulnerability
How exactly is the aviation industry at risk for a large-scale
cyberattack? Over the past two decades, the aviation industry’s
ICT has become increasingly complex and interconnected.35
30 Id. at 4–5.
31 Mark Holmes, How WestJet Dealt With ‘Hundreds of Thousands’ of Cyber Attacks,
AVIONICS INT’L (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/09/07/
westjet-dealt-hundreds-thousands-cyber-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/M6CH-ML
AQ].
32 Aviation Perspectives 2016 Special Report Series: Cybersecurity and the Airline Indus-
try, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 1, 1 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/indus-
trial-products/publications/assets/pwc-airline-industry-perspectives-cybersecurity
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NEN-4JWV].
33 Andrew V. Schmidt, Cyberterrorism: Combatting the Aviation Industry’s Vulnera-
bility to Cyberattack, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 169, 183–84 (2016).
34 The Connectivity Challenge: Protecting Critical Assets in a Networked World: A
Framework for Aviation Cybersecurity, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, at
Executive Summary (Aug. 2013), https://www.aiaa.org/uploadedfiles/issues_and_
advocacy/aiaa-cyber-framework-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5M7-FUZG].
35 Roberto Sabatini, Presentation of the First Cyber Security Workshop at
RMIT University, Cyber Security in the Aviation Context 1, 3 (Nov. 1, 2016), available
at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312191777_Cyber_Security_in_the
_Aviation_Context [https://perma.cc/GL7D-6S4Y].
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Historically, the aviation industry relied on ground-based radar
systems to manage air traffic.36 However, as air travel has contin-
ued to increase each year, traditional radar air traffic control
(ATC) systems have struggled to efficiently manage air traffic
while meeting increased demands.37 To resolve radar’s ineffi-
ciencies, aviation agencies worldwide are beginning to imple-
ment ATC systems that rely heavily on cyberspace and other
Internet Protocol (IP) technologies to communicate.38 One of
the ATC systems that the FAA created to manage air traffic more
efficiently is known as the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen).39
NextGen is a GPS-based navigation system that will enable
planes to “fly closer, descend straighter, and approach airports
from multiple angles.”40 For example, traditional radar ATC sys-
tems only update every twelve seconds, requiring air traffic tow-
ers to space planes a minimum of twenty-four seconds apart to
avoid any possible mid-air collisions.41 In contrast, NextGen’s
GPS system can report a plane’s location several times per sec-
ond, allowing air traffic towers at airports to reduce required
intervals between planes and allow for more efficient use of
crowded air space.42 Additionally, NextGen’s GPS system would
allow ATC towers to accurately locate an aircraft flying outside
the range of radar towers.43
While NextGen and other IP-based ATC systems would allow
ATC towers to more accurately locate aircraft and avoid air traf-
fic “gridlock,” IP-based ATC systems could also make the avia-
36 Jennifer Ann Urban, Not Your Granddaddy’s Aviation Industry: The Need to Im-
plement Cybersecurity Standards and Best Practices Within the International Aviation In-
dustry, 27 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 62, 71 (2017).
37 See generally Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 10.
38 Id. at 9.
39 Schmidt, supra note 33, at 188–89. The European Union created its own
analogous advanced IP-based ATC system known as “SESAR.” About: History,
SESAR, https://www.sesarju.eu/discover.sear/history [https://perma.cc/WN5Q-
939H].
40 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 11.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 11–12; see infra Figure 1.
43 NextGen’s ability to locate aircraft outside the range of radar could poten-
tially help prevent another aircraft from disappearing like Malaysian Flight
MH370. Roger Howard, ‘NextGen’ Tracking Would Mean No Plane Could Disappear.
So Why Aren’t We Using It?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.newsweek
.com/nextgen-tracking-would-mean-no-plane-could-disappear-so-why-arent-we-us
ing-it-232393 [https://perma.cc/FY2Q-ANKG].
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tion industry vulnerable to malicious cyberattacks.44 Because
NextGen relies on the internet to function, it is vulnerable to
hacking by cyber actors who could potentially disrupt air traffic
management by implanting a virus, malware, or other disruptive
programs within the NextGen system.45 Additionally, because
NextGen relies on GPS to accurately locate an aircraft’s loca-
tion, malicious cyber actors could potentially jam these GPS sig-
nals or even send pilots false location data, creating a serious
safety risk for commercial pilots and their passengers.46
Experts and even the U.S. government recognize these risks
and have criticized the FAA for failing to adequately address
these cybersecurity concerns.47 In 2015, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated the FAA’s efforts to ad-
dress cybersecurity risks associated with the FAA’s decision to
transition from radar ATC to NextGen’s IP-based systems.48 In
its report, the GAO identified three main areas of cybersecurity
concern, stating that the FAA needed to: “(1) protect[ ] . . .
(ATC) information systems, (2) protect[ ] aircraft avionics used
to operate and guide aircraft, and (3) clarify[ ] cybersecurity
roles and responsibilities among multiple FAA offices.”49 The
GAO admonished the FAA to address these issues before imple-
menting NextGen.50
Air traffic management systems are not the only areas of avia-
tion infrastructure where the industry has become more depen-
dent on the internet. Modern commercial aircraft have also
become more reliant on computers and IP-based systems.51 For
example, the information systems used on modern aircraft in-
clude: (1) the cockpit avionic systems that pilots use to navigate
the plane; and (2) the in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems that
airline passengers use to amuse themselves.52 The IFE systems
44 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 11.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-370, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL:
FAA NEEDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY AS
AGENCY TRANSITIONS TO NEXTGEN 2 (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
669627.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTJ4-8F5G] [hereinafter AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL]
(looking at how the FAA has addressed cybersecurity challenges).
48 Id. at “What GAO Found.”
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 18.
52 Id. Note that this is a highly simplified explanation. For more detailed expla-
nations, see Sabatini, supra note 35. See also infra Figure 2.
12 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
on today’s major airliners offer commercial passengers the abil-
ity to watch a variety of films, browse television channels, and
even connect to wireless internet (wi-fi) while in-flight.53 On
newer aircraft, both the avionic systems and IFE systems are in-
terconnected, meaning access to one system could potentially
provide access to the other.54 While in-flight wi-fi provides a wel-
come relief for passengers anxious to finish term papers or meet
work deadlines, the convenience of modern IFE systems may
also “potentially provide unauthorized remote access to aircraft
avionics systems.”55 Cybersecurity experts caution that
“[i]nternet connectivity in the cabin should be considered a di-
rect link between the aircraft and the outside world, which in-
cludes potential malicious actors.”56 Even an innocent passenger
could threaten an aircraft’s safety if, for example, the passenger
unintentionally accesses a website infected with a virus or
malware while using the in-flight wi-fi.57 Once a virus or malware
infects a passenger’s device, experts warn that a hacker could
potentially use the compromised devise to access the aircraft’s
“IP-connected onboard information system” and potentially
even the plane’s avionics.58
To prevent unauthorized access to a flight’s avionics, airlines
rely on firewalls to separate the IFE and passenger wi-fi from
avionic systems in the cockpit.59 However, according to cyber-
security experts, the GAO, and even the FAA, these firewalls are
easily circumvented, meaning a passenger on-board or even a
remote cyber actor could potentially access the cockpit avionics
systems.60 While reviewing the aviation industry’s cybersecurity
measures, one security consultant even reported that he discov-
ered a backdoor that could allow him access to one of the most
important pieces of satellite communication equipment on an
aircraft.61
53 Urban, supra note 36, at 76.
54 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, supra note 47, at “What GAO Found.” For example,
both the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and Airbus’s A350 and A380 have advanced
cockpit systems that are also connected to the main cabin IFE systems. Id. at 20.
55 Id. at “What GAO Found.”
56 Id. at 19.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 18.
60 Id.
61 Thomas Brewster, This Guy Hacked Hundreds of Planes from the Ground, FORBES
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/08/09/
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Even more alarming, a pilot’s own electronic devices, whether
personal or work related, could also provide malicious cyber ac-
tors with unauthorized access to an aircraft’s avionics.62 During
any flight, pilots must reference various resources such as navi-
gation charts, checklists, and aircraft manuals.63 Historically,
these manuals and other references were only available in paper
form, requiring airlines to print these materials in heavy binders
and then store these binders in the cockpit for pilot reference.64
To reduce paper clutter in the already cramped cockpits, air-
lines now provide most of these materials to pilots in digital
form on electronic tablets referred to as “electronic flight bags”
(EFBs).65 Many airlines give their pilots a light-weight tablet,
such as an iPad or Microsoft Surface, to carry on-board the air-
craft and access throughout the flight as needed.66
While EFBs are primarily used for pilots to reference neces-
sary materials during a flight, airlines also use these tablets to
provide their pilots with recurrent and on-going training mod-
ules.67 Additionally, some airlines allow their pilots to take these
tablets home so pilots can use them for training or their own
personal entertainment.68 Much like innocent passengers who
may stumble upon a virus-infected website during a flight, air-
line pilots could also potentially and unwittingly expose a flight
to a cyberattack if these pilots do not exercise caution while us-




62 Peter Cooper, Aviation Cybersecurity: Finding Lift, Minimizing Drag, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL 1, 31 (2017), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Aviation_Cyber
security_web_1107.pdf [https://perma.cc/83Z3-4ZZH].
63 See generally David Allen, Technology/Product Development Electronic Flight Bag,
AEROMAGAZINE BOEING, July 2003, at 16–27, available at http://www.boeing.com/
commercial/aeromagazine/aero_23/EFB.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXG8-NQA
N].
64 Aviation Perspectives 2016 Special Report Series, supra note 32, at 3.
65 Id.
66 See Malcolm Owen, Delta Allegedly Switching Flight Crew Hardware from Surface
to Ipad in Early 2018, APPLEINSIDER (Oct. 20, 2017), https://appleinsider.com/
articles/17/10/20/delta-allegedly-switching-flight-crew-hardware-from-surface-to-
ipad-in-early-2018 [https://perma.cc/M4YE-W5WY].
67 See Barbara G. Kanki & Thomas L. Seamster, Optimizing EFB Through Train-
ing, Standards, and Best Practices, 2007 INT’L SYMP. ON AVIATION PSYCH. 315 (2007),
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&con
text=isap_2007 [https://perma.cc/QG34-KKWH].
68 Id. at 316.
69 See Cooper, supra note 62, at 31.
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To ensure that EFBs do not pose a cyber threat to aviation
safety, before allowing any airline to issue its pilots an EFB tab-
let, national regulators like the FAA require airlines to imple-
ment firewalls and conduct recurring virus scans on EFB
software.70 Additionally, many airlines continually train their pi-
lots to refrain from allowing family members or friends to use
their EFB tablets.71 However, aviation cybersecurity experts be-
lieve these security measures may fail to adequately protect EFBs
from a cyberattack.72 Firewalls can be easily breached and ex-
perts note that the diversity of tablets and the complexity of de-
vices “may make it harder to demonstrate assurance and deliver
reliability.”73
Fortunately, as of fall 2018, these threats remain mostly hypo-
thetical and there are no credible reports of a cyberattack caus-
ing a commercial aircraft to crash.74 Though sensationalized
news sources have attempted to attribute various aircraft crashes
or disappearances to the handiwork of malicious cyber actors,75
there has yet to be any reliable reports that cyberattacks on air-
craft or the aviation industry have caused any deaths or serious
injuries.76 Currently, the possibility of a hacker remotely hi-
70 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AC NO. 120-76D, AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ELEC-
TRONIC FLIGHT BAGS 1, 21 (2017), available at https://www.faa.gov/documentLi
brary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-76D.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HZB-KN6
F].
71 See id. at 22.
72 Cooper, supra note 62, at 31.
73 Id.
74 Gontar et al., supra note 8, at 26.
75 Leslie Meredith, Malware Implicated in Fatal Spanair Plane Crash, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38790670/ns/technology_and_
science-security/t/malware-implicated-fatal-spanair-plane-crash/#.XAdT-C3Mx
8d [https://perma.cc/B9LT-VXKN]; Ed Bott, Fact Check: Malware Did Not Bring
Down a Passenger Jet, ZD NET (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
fact-check-malware-did-not-bring-down-a-passenger-jet/ [https://perma.cc/Y79
W-NMXZ]; Ruth Brown, Mystery of MH370 Only Grows After Final Report Into Disap-
pearance, N.Y. POST (July 31, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/07/31/mystery-of-
mh370-only-grows-after-final-report-into-disappearance/ [https://perma.cc/E2T
W-TCJV].
76 During a September 2018 hearing before the House Committee on Home-
land Security, one panelist noted that he has yet to see a credible report that
shows it is possible for a hacker to hijack a plane remotely, but also acknowledged
that “[w]e do not know what we do not know.” Understanding Cybersecurity Threats
to America’s Aviation Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th
Cong. (2018), (testimony of Jeffrey L. Troy, Executive Director, Aviation Infor-
mation Sharing Analysis, Inc.) [hereinafter Hearing], available at https://docs
.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM08/20180906/108646/HHRG-115-HM08-Wstate-
TroyJ-20180906.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX8V-J6AG].
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jacking a commercial aircraft remains highly unlikely.77 How-
ever, industry experts and regulators acknowledge that these
kinds of cyberattacks are theoretically possible78 and the aviation
industry remains an attractive target for malicious cyber actors.79
Experts warn that as these malicious actors continue to wage
cyberattacks against the industry, they will also use more and
more sophisticated methods of hacking in their attempts to infil-
trate aviation systems.80 Some cyber experts even estimate that it
is only a “matter of time before a cybersecurity breach on an
airline occurs.”81
2. Anecdotes
Though no casualties have occurred, there are reported inci-
dents of cyberattacks against the aviation industry and these at-
tacks continue to increase each year.82 Some hackers and cyber
experts even allege that they have already been able to success-
fully hack a commercial aircraft.83
In the fall of 2017, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) report surfaced alleging that a DHS-led research team
had been able to remotely hack into the systems of a commer-
cial Boeing 757 jet.84 According to this report, the DHS research
team allegedly hacked the jet during a 2016 test while the plane
77 See id.
78 Matthew Hoye & Rene Marsh, GAO: Newer Aircraft Vulnerable to Hacking, CNN
(Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/14/politics/gao-newer-aircraft-
vulnerable-to-hacking/ [https://perma.cc/TPQ8-6368].
79 During a September 2018 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Committee hearing, Chairman Katko stated that malicious actors are “constantly
trying to probe how to get into our systems and attack our airlines.” Understanding
Cybersecurity Threats to America’s Aviation Sector, YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2018 at 24:10),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FUI6EDk6as&feature=youtu.be [https://
perma.cc/59BK-PV8M].
80 See Holmes, supra note 31.
81 Kris Van Cleave, DHS Experts Warn it’s a “Matter of Time” Before Hackers Hit
Commercial Airliners, CBS NEWS (June 12, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
cybersecurity-dhs-experts-warn-its-a-matter-of-time-before-commercial-airliners-
get-hacked/ [https://perma.cc/K5NG-8TKM].
82 See Holmes, supra note 31.
83 Brewster, supra note 61.
84 See Peggy Hollinger, Can Your Flight Be Hacked?, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/2e416eca-4e3d-11e8-ac41-759eee1efb74 [https://
perma.cc/H5B7-UGTW]; Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ACT R & D Risk Summary
and Report, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4495659-
DHS-Document-Release-on-Aviation-Cybersecurity.html [https://perma.cc/
T3VV-PC4M].
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was sitting on the ramp outside the Atlantic City Airport.85 While
the authenticity and truthfulness of this report remain uncer-
tain, members of the United States Congressional Committee
on Homeland Security referred to the report during a Septem-
ber 2018 hearing as evidence of the need to enhance aviation
cybersecurity.86
In a separate 2015 incident, a security researcher allegedly
hacked a United Airlines plane by connecting his laptop to a
Seat Electronic Box (SEB) under his passenger seat during his
flight.87 The researcher claimed that he was able to access the
plane’s avionics through the SEB and briefly commandeer the
plane by issuing a climb command.88 After publishing a tweet in
which he boasted that he was considering playing with the
plane’s avionics,89 United Airlines contacted the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and federal agents seized the re-
searcher and his laptop upon landing.90 The researcher also
claimed that he had accessed in-flight networks at least fifteen
times during various flights, but claimed that he did so to raise
cybersecurity awareness.91 Despite his claims, it remains uncer-
tain whether or not the researcher actually caused the United
plane to climb, and manufacturers like Boeing have attempted
to discredit the researcher’s hacking claim as impossible.92
While the idea that a hacker could remotely hijack a commer-
cial jet is certainly alarming, cyberattacks against the aviation in-
dustry often take subtler forms. As of 2018, the majority of the
reported cyberattacks in aviation have involved other areas of
aviation infrastructure, such as airline websites, airline
85 Hollinger, supra note 84; ACT R & D Risk Summary and Report, supra note
84.
86 Understanding Cybersecurity Threats to America’s Aviation Sector, supra note 79, at
20:09, 27:36.
87 Kim Zetter, Is It Possible For Passengers to Hack Commercial Aircraft?, WIRED
(May 26, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/possible-passengers-hack-com
mercial-aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/MY5S-9BAR].
88 Id.
89 Id.; see infra Figure 3.
90 Zetter, supra note 87.
91 Jose Pagliery, Fearing United Plane Was Hacked, FBI Pulls Security Expert Off
Flight, CNN (Apr. 17, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/17/technology/
security/fbi-plane-hack/index.html [https://perma.cc/5HUH-KZDG].
92 Evan Perez, FBI: Hacker Claimed to Have Taken Over Flight’s Engine Controls,
CNN (May 18, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/17/us/fbi-hacker-flight-
computer-systems/index.html [https://perma.cc/6T46-74V8].
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databases, and airport websites.93 While these attacks may not
pose as direct a threat to human life or commercial flight safety,
these attacks cause significant financial loss and lead to serious
disruptions of international commerce and travel.94 Addition-
ally, cyberattacks on aviation infrastructure—like an airline or
airport website—cause serious reputational damage and security
experts warn that these attacks could harm the flying public’s
perception by creating unnecessary fear that commercial avia-
tion is insecure and unsafe.95
For example, less than a year after the mysterious disappear-
ance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370,96 Malaysia Airlines suf-
fered another reputational blow when a group known as “Lizard
Squad – Official Cyber Caliphate” hacked Malaysia Airline’s
website and re-directed visitors to a page with a picture of a liz-
ard wearing a top hat and text reading “404 – Plane Not
Found.”97 The page also included a tab stating, “ISIS will
prevail.”98
Along with causing an airline reputational harm, cyberattacks
on an airline’s website can interfere with an airline’s ability to
sell tickets and serve its customers.99 Today, many commercial
airlines rely on internet sales and webpages to carry out their
93 See Hearing, supra note 76 (statement of Christopher Porter, Chief Intelli-
gence Strategist, Fireeye, Inc.).
94 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 5.
95 Hearing, supra note 76 (statement of Christopher Porter).
96 Flight MH370 remains one of aviation’s biggest mysteries. See Sinead Baker,
The Mystery of MH370 Remains 5 Years Later—Here are All the Theories, Dead Ends,
and Unanswered Questions from the Most Bizarre Airline Disaster of the Century, BUS.
INSIDER (July 28, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/mh370-theories-dead-
ends-unanswered-questions-ahead-of-major-new-report-2018-7 [https://perma
.cc/A8UY-5U33]. As of 2018, only small portions of the plane have been recov-
ered. All 239 of MH370’s passengers and crew are presumed dead. Id. None of
their remains have been found. Id.; Yantoultra Ngui & Gaurav Raghuvanshi, Ma-
laysia Airlines Flight 370 Reports Leaves Families in Dark Four Years On, WALL ST. J.
(July 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysia-airlines-flight-370-report-
leaves-families-in-dark-four-years-on-1532955801 [https://perma.cc/5F9B-RYJB].
97 Terrence McCoy, Lizard Squad Hacks Malaysia Airlines, Claiming Link to Is-
lamic State, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2015/01/26/lizard-squad-hacks-malaysia-airlines-claiming-link-
to-islamic-state/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a7b35d661030 [https://perma.cc/
33LK-9F45]; see infra Figure 4.
98 Clement Tan, Malaysia Airlines Websites Hacked With ISIS Attack Claim, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-26/
malaysia-air-website-hacked-with-phrase-isis-will-prevail-.
99 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 14.
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businesses, creating a digital “Achilles heel.”100 This cyber-de-
pendence provides terrorists and other cyber-political groups
with easy targets to attack. For example, the conflict between
Israel and Palestine is now being waged in cyberspace as well as
in the Middle East.101 Pro-Palestinian hackers have continuously
targeted the website of Israel’s national airline, El Al, as well as
other areas of Israeli cyber-infrastructure.102 In 2012, Pro-Pales-
tinian hackers successfully brought down El Al’s website, making
the airline unable to process new reservations.103
Along with attacking airlines, malicious cyber actors have also
targeted airports and their websites.104 During a 2015 cyberat-
tack, hackers defaced the website of a Tasmanian airport by re-
placing the website with pro-radical Islamic messages, such as “I
am Muslim & I love jihad/I love ISIS.”105 While the attack did
not impact the safety of any of the airport’s flights or operations,
the attack exemplifies the way in which alleged cyberterrorists
attempt to disrupt the aviation industry and damage the public’s
faith in flight safety.
These examples demonstrate how malicious cyberattacks im-
pact all sectors of the aviation industry and how these attacks are
not restricted to a single nation or corporation. When a cyberat-
tack causes a disruption at any major airport worldwide—
whether it is Hartsfield-Jackson in Atlanta, Heathrow in London,
or Dubai International Airport in the United Arab Emirates—
the global aviation community continues to feel the impact for
days afterwards.106 While cybersecurity measures by one nation’s
regulatory body may help to mitigate damage and even deter
cyberattacks in one nation, these anecdotes illustrate that avia-
100 Id.
101 Aviel Magnezi, Cyber War: El Al, Stock Exchange Sites Down, YNET NEWS (Jan.
16, 2012), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4176132,00.html
[https://perma.cc/UPB4-VGSX].
102 Erik Kain, Cyber Attacks Take Down Two Israeli Websites – Is Cyber Warfare the




103 Id.; see infra Figure 5.
104 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 16.
105 Hobart Airport Website Hacked with ‘Pro-Islamic Militant Messages,’ ABC NEWS
(Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-12/hobart-aiport-website-
hacked-with-pro-islamic-militant-messages/6386936 [https://perma.cc/BT5W-
478M]; see infra Figure 6.
106 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 14.
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tion cybersecurity is ultimately a global problem that warrants a
global solution.
III. EXISTING AVIATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW
In order to determine a cybersecurity solution for interna-
tional aviation, it is important to first understand existing inter-
national aviation law, its framework, and how it developed.
Though Orville Wright made manned flight a reality in 1903,
international aviation law did not fully develop until interna-
tional flight and commercial passenger aviation became realities
during the World War II.107 During World War II, innovations
such as the development of radar, jet engines, pressurized cab-
ins, and lighter metals made international air travel by plane a
possibility.108 These innovations ushered in a new era of civilian
air travel between nations, creating the need for international
aviation agreements and laws.109 Though some international avi-
ation laws existed before World War II, this existing framework
was highly inefficient because it consisted of a “patchwork of
hundreds of individual agreements between countries.”110 As
the end of World War II approached, the international commu-
nity recognized the need for a uniform legal framework in
aviation.111
1. Chicago Convention and the Creation of ICAO
In 1944, delegates from fifty-two countries held a conference
in Chicago, Illinois, to discuss developments in international avi-
ation.112 During this conference, delegates from each country
signed a treaty which became known as the Chicago Convention
on International Aviation.113 The Chicago Convention replaced
the patchwork aviation agreements between countries and cre-
ated a global legal framework that would allow for “interna-
107 Dawna L. Rhoades, Who Governs International Aviation? in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
AVIATION 43, 41–47 (Elizabeth A. Hoppe ed., 2011).
108 Id.
109 Id.




113 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (effective Apr. 4, 1947) [hereinafter Chicago
Convention].
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tional commercial aviation to flourish.”114 The Convention
recognized the right of every member nation to maintain its sov-
ereign airspace, regulate air travel within the nation’s own bor-
ders, and encouraged member states to adopt uniform air
regulations created by international aviation regulators.115 Addi-
tionally, a 1998 Amendment to the Chicago Convention prohib-
its the use of weapons by member states against any civilian
aircraft.116
The Chicago Convention also created ICAO to develop a uni-
form system of international aviation regulations.117 Today,
ICAO is a body of the U.N. and is the international administra-
tive agency that specializes in aviation regulation worldwide.118
All nations involved in international aviation are members of
ICAO.119
ICAO consists of three branches—the Assembly, the Secreta-
riat, and the Council.120 The ICAO Assembly contains represent-
atives from ICAO member states and meets every three years to
review the agency’s work, decide on policies, approve a budget,
approve amendments to the Chicago Convention, and select
which member states will participate in ICAO’s rulemaking
body.121 The ICAO Secretariat implements the Assembly’s policy
and contains various committees or bureaus of expertise.122 The
ICAO Council is the rulemaking body that establishes standards
and recommended practices (SARPs) for international air travel
that are “considered necessary for the safety or regularity of in-
ternational air navigation.”123 Before establishing SARPs, the
ICAO Council receives technical expertise and advice from vari-
ous ICAO Committees.124 The ICAO Council then votes
whether to approve a proposed SARP.125 If two-thirds of the
114 PEARSON & RILEY, supra note 110, at 308.
115 Id. at 309.
116 Schmidt, supra note 33, at 196.
117 Id. at 197.
118 ICAO and the United Nations, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., https://www
.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/icao-and-the-united-nations.aspx [https://
perma.cc/Y7P2-NAZR].
119 Rhoades, supra note 107, at 43.
120 PEARSON & RILEY, supra note 110, at 309.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 309–10.
124 Id. at 309.
125 Id. at 310.
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ICAO Council approve the SARP, it becomes incorporated into
the Chicago Convention as an Annex.126
Annexes to the Chicago Convention are guidelines that gov-
ern different areas of international aviation.127 The Annexes
provide ICAO member states with aviation SARPs that regulate
issues such as airworthiness of aircraft, pilot training and licens-
ing, and environmental protection.128 Annexes do not have the
power of law and ICAO has no legal authority to enforce the
Annexes.129 However, ICAO member states are expected to
comply with the Annexes and implement these standards when
promulgating their own national aviation regulations.130 If an
ICAO member state does not wish to comply with an Annex
Standard, the member state must notify ICAO of its intentions
and file an exception with ICAO.131 However, if an ICAO mem-
ber state refuses to comply with an Annex Recommended Prac-
tice, the member state is not obligated to notify ICAO or file an
exception.132 Currently there are eighteen Annexes to the Chi-
cago Convention.133 Annex 17 establishes ICAO’s civil aviation
security program and requires each member state to protect
against unlawful interference with civil aviation.134
2. Tokyo Convention
Though the Chicago Convention, its Annexes, and ICAO all
provide the global aviation community with a uniform legal
framework, during the 1960s and 70s, the global aviation com-
munity recognized the need to enact additional treaties that
could combat international aviation crimes such as hijacking
and terrorism.135 In 1963, ICAO members signed the Conven-
tion on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
126 Id.
127 Id. at 312.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 311–12.
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Aircraft (Tokyo Convention)136 in Tokyo, Japan.137 The treaty
marked the first international effort to “assert formal interna-
tional control over the criminal acts of hijackers.”138 Specifically,
the treaty prohibited acts that jeopardize the safety of commer-
cial aircraft or passengers while the aircraft is in flight.139 The
Tokyo Convention also vested the aircraft commander (typically
the captain) with the authority to restrain persons jeopardizing
the flight’s safety and then deliver these individuals to state au-
thorities in the territory where the aircraft lands.140 The Tokyo
Convention granted jurisdiction and prosecutorial power of any
treaty violations to the state of aircraft registry.141 In addition to
establishing the powers of the aircraft commander and the du-
ties of states involved, the Tokyo Convention also adopted the
expression “unlawful seizure of aircraft” to denote “aircraft hi-
jacking” or the “wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft.”142
Though the Tokyo Convention granted prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion to the nation where the aircraft was registered, the treaty
greatly limited the ability of other nations to claim jurisdiction
over a Tokyo Convention violation.143 For nations other than
the nation of aircraft registry, the Tokyo Convention only al-
lowed states that were affected by the on-board offense in some
manner to claim prosecutorial jurisdiction.144 If a violation of
the treaty occurred while an aircraft was cruising above a state’s
territory, the state that claimed this sovereign airspace could not
exercise jurisdiction over the hijacker or offender without dem-
onstrating some territorial impact.145
Along with failing to grant a member state jurisdiction over
offenses carried out above its own sovereign airspace, the Tokyo
Convention also failed “to create a definitive obligation on be-
136 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention].
137 Michael S. Simons, A Review of Issues Concerned with Aerial Hijacking and Ter-
rorism: Implications for Australia’s Security and the Sydney 2000 Olympics, 63 J. AIR L. &
COM. 731, 740 (1998).
138 Id. at 741.
139 Id. at 742.
140 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 776 (6th ed. 2014).
141 Simons, supra note 137, at 742.
142 Id.
143 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 140, at 776.
144 Paul S. Dempsey, Aerial Piracy and Terrorism: Unilateral and Multilateral Re-
sponses to Aircraft Hijacking, 2 CONN. J. INT’L L. 427, 432 & n.26 (1987).
145 Id.
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half of its signatories actually to prosecute or extradite” a hi-
jacker offender.146 Additionally, the Tokyo Convention also
failed to declare hijacking an international crime.147 Conse-
quently, the Tokyo Convention was criticized for its lack of en-
forcement power as well as its failure to deter aircraft
hijackings.148 Despite these criticisms, the Tokyo Convention
was the first step in the right direction for the international avia-
tion community and ICAO members attempting to grapple with
the new crimes of aircraft hijacking.149
3. Hague Convention
To compensate for the failures of the Tokyo Convention,
ICAO member representatives signed another treaty in 1971—
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft (Hague Convention).150 Using the Tokyo Convention as its
foundation, the signers of the Hague Convention took a defini-
tive stance on aircraft hijacking by declaring the hijacking of an
aircraft an international crime.151 The Convention criminalized
the conduct of aircraft hijackings and established severe punish-
ments for the unlawful seizure of an aircraft in flight.152
The Hague Convention expanded prosecutorial jurisdiction
to include: “the state of registration of the aircraft, the state in
which the aircraft land[ed] with the offender on board, and the
state of the principal place of business or permanent residence
of the lessee of the aircraft.”153 Unlike its predecessor, the
Hague Convention created mandatory extradition requirements
for the states that signed the treaty.154 If the state that appre-
hended a hijacker failed to extradite the alleged offender to a
state that could establish prosecutorial jurisdiction, the Hague
Convention required the state holding custody of the offender
to begin prosecuting the offender, even if the custodial state was
not impacted by the offense.155 This obligation to either extra-
146 Id.
147 Id. at 434.
148 Id. at 433–34.
149 Id. at 444–45.
150 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
151 Dempsey, supra note 144, at 435.
152 Id. at 435–36.
153 Id. at 435.
154 Id.
155 Hague Convention, supra note 150, art. 7.
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dite or prosecute became known as the “Hague Formula”156 and
has been repeated in subsequent international aviation conven-
tions as well as conventions related to war crimes and other uni-
versally condemned acts.157
While the Hague Convention was a marked improvement
from its predecessor, the Hague Convention also suffered from
its own weaknesses. Specifically, the Convention failed to
criminalize acts of aircraft sabotage that fell short of a physical
hijacking or seizure of the aircraft.158
4. Montreal Convention and 1988 Supplement
To criminalize acts of aircraft sabotage that failed to qualify as
criminal acts under the Hague Convention, ICAO member rep-
resentatives signed the Convention on the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention) in 1971.159 The Montreal Convention was a re-
sponse to a rise in bombings and sabotage of aircraft that were
not addressed in earlier aviation treaties.160 Specifically, the
Montreal Convention criminalized acts of violence onboard air-
craft, destruction of aircraft, as well as acts that damage aircraft
or render the aircraft incapable of flying.161 The Montreal Con-
vention made it illegal to bring substances onboard an aircraft
that damaged the aircraft and also outlawed any acts that caused
serious damage to air navigation facilities.162 The Montreal Con-
vention adopted the same “extradite or prosecute” formula of
the Hague Convention, creating the possibility that several states
could exercise jurisdiction over violators of the Montreal Con-
vention in the event that one state was unwilling or unable to
prosecute.163
However, the Montreal Convention limited itself to criminal-
izing violent acts that targeted physical aircraft.164 In the 1980s,
the international aviation community realized that the Montreal
156 It is also known as “aut dedere aut judicare.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the
Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc A/69/10, at 139, 145 (2014).
157 Witten, supra note 135, at 141.
158 Dempsey, supra note 144, at 436.
159 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
160 Dempsey, supra note 144, at 436–37.
161 Montreal Convention, supra note 159, art. 1.
162 Id. art. 1.
163 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 140, at 777.
164 Witten, supra note 135, at 141.
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Convention needed to be strengthened to address other kinds
of attacks against civil aviation—specifically terrorist attacks
targeting international airports.165 In 1985, terrorists attacked
both the Rome and Vienna Airports.166 To expand the Montreal
Convention to extend beyond aircraft and protect international
airports, ICAO members supplemented the Montreal Conven-
tion by creating the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
in 1988 Protocol.167 The Protocol criminalized violent, danger-
ous, or damaging acts at airports and declared these acts a viola-
tion of international law.168
5. Beijing Convention
The 9/11 attacks marked a watershed moment for ICAO and
the aviation industry when terrorists hijacked American aircraft
and then used these aircraft as weapons of terror. Though previ-
ous ICAO conventions addressed and criminalized the hijacking
of aircraft, the 9/11 attacks highlighted weaknesses in the ex-
isting international aviation conventions.169 In response to the
9/11 attacks, ICAO and its member nations began a nine-year
process to strengthen and modernize existing aviation conven-
tions like the Hague Convention and Montreal Convention.170
After nine years of negotiating, the Beijing Convention was con-
cluded on September 10, 2010, and as of July 1, 2018, the treaty
is now in force.171
The Beijing Convention prohibits the use of aircraft as weap-
ons.172 The Beijing Convention also expands the scope of hi-
jacking offenses to include acts that further the hijacking both
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serv-
ing International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol].
168 Id. art. II.
169 Witten, supra note 135, at 141.
170 Id.
171 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International
Civil Aviation, Sept. 10, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 144 [hereinafter Beijing Convention];
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, Sept. 10, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 153 [hereinafter Beijing Protocol].
Note: because both the Beijing Protocol and Beijing Convention work together
in unison, this Article will simply refer to both of them as one single unit and
reference them as “the Beijing Convention.”
172 Beijing Convention, supra note 171, art. 1, ¶ 1(f).
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before and after the flight.173 The Beijing Convention acknowl-
edges advances in technology and cyberspace and criminalizes
seizures of aircraft achieved “by any technological means.”174
Along with criminalizing the use of civil aircraft as weapons, the
Beijing Convention also criminalizes the release of any biologi-
cal, chemical, or nuclear weapons or related material on a
flight.175 Additionally, the Beijing Convention prohibits the use
of dangerous materials to attack aircraft or ground facilities and
prohibits hijacking or attacks on air navigation facilities by tech-
nological means or coercion.176 ICAO has clarified that the Beij-
ing Convention also criminalizes cyberattacks on air navigation
facilities.177 By expanding the prohibitions of previous aviation
conventions and criminalizing the use of aircraft, nuclear mater-
ials, and technology as weapons, the Beijing Convention has
helped bring international aviation law into the twenty-first
century.
The Beijing Convention adopts the “extradite or prosecute”
formula of the Hague Convention, but also expands jurisdiction
to allow states to claim jurisdiction over a treaty violation if the
offense is committed by the state’s national or a victim of the
offense is a state’s national.178 Additionally, the Beijing Conven-
tion also allows a legal entity, such as a corporation, to be held
criminally liable if a nation’s domestic law allows.179
While the Beijing Convention criminalizes malicious cyberat-
tacks against civil aviation, as of September 2018, only thirty-four
of the 192 ICAO member states have signed the Beijing Conven-
tion and only sixteen states have ratified it.180 Despite the ICAO
173 Witten, supra note 135, at 142.
174 Beijing Protocol, supra note 171, art. II, ¶ 1.
175 Witten, supra note 135, at 142; Beijing Convention, supra note 171, art. 1, ¶
1(g).
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6, 2017), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/CYBER2017/Documents/Draft%20Du
bai%20DECLARATION%20ON%20CYBERSECURITY%20IN%20CIVIL%20AVI
ATION_10%20March%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEM6-UX3A]; JAMES JOR-
DAN, EMERGING THREATS IN A CHANGING WORLD: BEIJING CONVENTION ON AVIA-
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Assembly urging all ICAO member states to ratify the Beijing
Convention in a 2016 Resolution, it remains uncertain whether
all ICAO members will actually make themselves parties to the
new treaty.181
6. Other Sources of International Aviation Law
While ICAO is responsible for actually implementing interna-
tional aviation regulations, much of the international aviation
community is also influenced by nongovernmental organiza-
tions, as well as corporations like Boeing or Airbus.182 For exam-
ple, along with establishing ICAO, the Chicago Convention also
led to the creation of the IATA to work as an international
“trade association” composed of various airlines.183 Since its for-
mation in 1945, IATA and its member airlines have worked to
promote safety in civil aviation and set industry standards such
as carry-on baggage allowance, ticketing procedures, and rate
agreements.184 IATA plays an important role in allowing mem-
bers of the global aviation community to set aviation standards
without having to wait for ICAO member states to negotiate or
sign another treaty.185
Additionally, states’ domestic aviation regulatory bodies also
influence international aviation and regulations.186 For exam-
ple, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is the
“agency responsible for negotiating and enforcing most interna-
tional aviation treaties and agreements.”187 The FAA, the admin-
istration responsible for regulating American aviation, is a part
of the DOT.188 Today, the DOT plays a significant role in the
global aviation economy.189 Foreign airlines often enter into
code-sharing agreements to allow each other to sell tickets for
TION ORG., https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Beijing
_Conv_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ3A-WMM6].
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other airlines.190 Because the DOT must first approve these
code-sharing agreements between U.S. and foreign airlines, the
DOT wields serious economic power over the international avia-
tion industry.191
Aircraft manufacturer corporations also exercise a large influ-
ence on the international aviation community. For example, the
two largest commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world in-
clude Airbus and Boeing.192 The American Boeing Company
and European company Airbus SE each own “roughly 50% of
the global commercial airliner market.”193 Because Boeing and
Airbus manufacture the majority of the aircraft used in interna-
tional commercial aviation, both companies must also comply
with nations’ domestic aviation regulatory agencies as well as in-
ternational agencies like ICAO.194 Because these companies
compete to produce the most sought after aircraft for airlines,
Airbus and Boeing constantly try to innovate and make their
planes more technologically advanced and efficient.195 However,
as these manufacturers rush to add new features to their aircraft,
production teams may fail to notice cyber loopholes or other
cyber insecurities of these features.196 As mentioned previously,
these manufacturers do not always address cyber issues until af-
ter a nation’s aviation regulatory agency (like the FAA in the
United States) discovers the issue and then demands that the
companies implement safeguards.197
190 Id. at 322.
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B. ARE INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAWMAKERS AND
ORGANIZATIONS ADDRESSING CYBER THREATS?
As cyberattacks have become more prevalent in the past two
decades, cybersecurity awareness has also increased among gov-
ernments, corporations, and civilian populations.198 Thanks to
this increased awareness, international aviation lawmakers, orga-
nizations, corporations, and domestic regulators have all taken
steps to address new cyber threats to aviation in recent years.199
For example, in 2013, the ICAO Council modified Annex 17
of the Chicago Convention, which addresses security.200 Annex
17 now includes a Recommended Practice, urging each ICAO
member state to “develop measures in order to protect informa-
tion and communication technology systems used for civil avia-
tion purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation.”201 However, because the change is only a Rec-
ommended Practice, ICAO member states are not required to
comply with the suggestion or even notify ICAO if the state in-
tends not to comply.202 Along with modifying Annex 17, ICAO
members recently created Resolution A39-19—Addressing
Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation.203 The Resolution “sets out the
actions to be undertaken by States . . . to counter cyber threats
to civil aviation through a cross-cutting, horizontal and collabo-
rative approach.”204 However, like all ICAO Resolutions, A39-19
is just a guidance document and is not binding upon ICAO
member states.205
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During the 39th Session, ICAO also established the Secreta-
riat Study Group on Cybersecurity (SSGC) to focus on cyber is-
sues related to air navigation systems, airworthiness, and
aerodromes.206 SSGC reviews existing cybersecurity SARPs and
works to promote cybersecurity awareness throughout the
global aviation community.207 While these efforts demonstrate
that ICAO takes aviation cybersecurity issues seriously, some
scholars have criticized ICAO’s efforts for not being “thorough
or concrete enough” and some critics claim that many of these
measures have not been implemented “quickly enough to gar-
ner support” or effectively address aviation cybersecurity
issues.208
In 2017, ICAO took additional steps to promote aviation
cybersecurity by formalizing the Declaration on Cybersecurity in
Civil Aviation.209 While not binding, the Declaration set out
cybersecurity goals and policies for ICAO member states.210 In
particular, the Declaration established that it is the responsibil-
ity of ICAO member states to help mitigate the risks posed by
cyber threats to civil aviation and that each state needs to take
action against cyber actors targeting the aviation industry.211
The Declaration also claims that cyberattacks on civil aviation
must be considered an offense against the international aviation
community.212
Domestic regulatory agencies like the FAA have also made ef-
forts to increase cybersecurity measures at the domestic level.213
For example, the FAA has met with members of the airline in-
dustry like Boeing and Airbus to discuss security measures on
aircraft and find ways to increase aircraft cybersecurity.214 The
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207 Id.
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FAA also created a Cyber-Security Steering Committee to ad-
dress and respond to cyber concerns in commercial aviation.215
Aviation manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus have also
made efforts to enhance cybersecurity on commercial aircraft.
In 2012, Boeing implemented additional security measures on
its Boeing 777 jet to prevent onboard hacking of critical com-
puter systems.216 Additionally, Boeing started a friendly hacker
program to improve the cybersecurity of its new aircraft, the 787
Dreamliner.217 As part of the program, Boeing pays friendly
hackers to find ways to break into the Dreamliner’s onboard
software and then inform Boeing of security holes so it can im-
plement additional cybersecurity measures.218 Boeing’s Euro-
pean competitor, Airbus, has also invested heavily in
cybersecurity research and development for its commercial air-
craft.219 In 2017, Airbus teamed up with an international infor-
mation technology company, SITA, to launch the first aviation
Security Operation’s Center (SOC).220 Airbus’s SOC works to
mitigate cyber risks in civil aviation by responding to cyberat-
tacks and then sharing this information with the aviation
industry.221
C. IS EXISTING AVIATION LAW SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS AND
DETER CYBER THREATS TO AVIATION?
While these examples demonstrate that the aviation industry
is taking steps in the right direction to address cybersecurity is-
sues, there are still no uniform international cybersecurity stan-
dards that bind the aviation industry or nations.222 And while
the Beijing Convention implicitly outlaws malicious cyberattacks
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against aircraft or air-navigational facilities, the Convention
lacks the enforcement power necessary to hold malicious cyber
actors and their host nations accountable. Without accountabil-
ity, there is little to deter cyberterrorists from exploiting avia-
tion’s technological vulnerabilities.
For example, though the Beijing Convention and previous
aviation treaties require state parties to extradite or prosecute
an alleged cyber-hijacker, ICAO has little, if any, power to pun-
ish a member state for refusing to comply with this require-
ment.223 Currently, if a member state fails to comply with the
Beijing prosecution or extradition requirements, the only penal-
ties that ICAO can impose on the non-compliant state is to strip
that member nation of its voting power in the ICAO Council
and Assembly.224
A nation that is a party to the Beijing Convention might re-
fuse to comply with the extradition or prosecution requirement
for various reasons: the alleged criminal may be one of the
state’s nationals that the state wishes to protect; the state may
believe there is inadequate evidence to establish a prima facie
case that the accused actually committed the offense; the state
may not trust that the nation requesting extradition will be able
to carry out a fair trial; or even worse—the state may have spon-
sored the attack itself.225 For states complicit in an aviation
cyberattack, the consequences of ICAO penalties may be out-
weighed by the potential political or financial benefits of a
cyberattack on another nation’s aircraft or aviation facilities.
Unfortunately, these issues are not just hypothetical. History
has shown that states do not always comply with their aviation
treaty obligations.226 For example, in 1988, terrorists planted a
bomb on a Pan American World Airways plane scheduled to fly
from London to New York.227 The bomb exploded over Lock-
erbie, Scotland, destroying the plane and killing all 243 passen-




225 CRIMINAL LAW SECTION, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, IMPLEMENTATION
KITS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS 8 (2003) [here-
inafter IMPLEMENTATION KITS], https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/
Commonwealth_Chapter_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X2V-7276].
226 Sarah Mazzochi, The Age of Impunity: Using the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute
and Universal Jurisdiction to End Impunity for Acts of Terrorism Once and For All, 32 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 75, 96 (2011).
227 Id. at 78.
2019] PREVENTING A CYBER-9/11 33
gers and eleven crew members on board.228 Fiery debris from
the plane also killed eleven people when it fell to the ground in
Lockerbie, Scotland.229
After three years, and testimonies from more than 15,000 wit-
nesses, two Libyan nationals were indicted for the bombing.230
When authorities from the United States and the United King-
dom requested that the Libyan government extradite the two
alleged bombers, the Libyan government refused.231 In its de-
fense, the Libyan government argued that the Montreal Con-
vention authorized Libya to prosecute its own nationals and that
it was not required to extradite the alleged bombers if Libya
handled the matter in its own domestic courts.232 However, al-
lowing Libya to exercise jurisdiction over the matter raised seri-
ous concerns due to evidence that Libya’s leader, Muammar al-
Gaddafi, likely sponsored the bombing himself.233 Despite
Libya’s assertion that it would exercise its own prosecutorial ju-
risdiction over the alleged bombers, Libya failed to prosecute
the two alleged bombers or discipline them at all for fifteen
years.234 It took until 2003 for the Libyan government to finally
accept responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and also agree
to compensate families of the victims.235
Just as the Lockerbie bombers evaded prosecution for fifteen
years due to Libya’s refusal to extradite or prosecute, cyberter-
rorists could also remain unaccountable for a cyberterrorist at-
tack or hijacking of a civilian aircraft if a host nation fails to
comply with its treaty obligations. For a cyberterrorist attack on
aviation, this risk is heightened even more due to the remote
nature of cyberattacks.236 For example, with events like the
Lockberbie bombings or the 9/11 hijackings, terrorists are ei-
228 Id.
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ther physically present during the attack or they physically plant
an explosive, making it much easier to trace these attacks using
physical evidence or eyewitness accounts.237 However, a remote
cyberattack can be much more difficult to trace. Tools like the
Onion Router can mask a hacker’s true location, making it
much more difficult to trace an attack back to the correct host
nation.238
Additionally, if a victim nation lacks the technological means
to provide evidence that the perpetrator committed the crime
while acting remotely in a different host nation, the victim na-
tion would likely struggle to present adequate evidence during
an international tribunal.239 A host nation of a cyberterrorist
might argue that the victim nation has not shown adequate
proof that their national perpetrated the cyberattack. Addition-
ally, even if a victim nation can successfully demonstrate that
another state’s nationals were responsible for a deadly cyberat-
tack, the host nation might still legally refuse to extradite its na-
tionals by insisting on prosecuting the alleged criminals in its
own domestic courts. Like the Lockerbie bombings, this could
result in the host nation failing to ever actually prosecute the
alleged terrorists.
If the Beijing Convention lacks adequate enforcement mecha-
nisms to hold party-nations accountable for their binding treaty
agreements, then the international aviation community is even
more powerless to hold non-party nations or their nationals ac-
countable for an aviation cyberattack. Under customary interna-
tional law, states have no duty to surrender individuals accused
of committing offenses in a foreign state’s territory.240 Before a
state can demand a second nation to extradite one of its nation-
als, there must be some existing extradition agreement between
237 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony in the Lockerbie Bombing Case,
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the two nations or a treaty, like the Beijing Convention, that pro-
vides grounds for extradition.241 However, if a nation hosting a
“cyber hijacker” or actor is not a party to the Beijing Convention
and also has no extradition arrangement with the victim nation,
the host nation may legally refuse to hand over the remote hi-
jacker for prosecution, leaving these hacker-hijackers unac-
countable and at large.242
While it took more than fifteen years to bring the Lockerbie
bombers to justice, a similar miscarriage of justice could likely
be prevented if the global community adopted universal juris-
diction to apply to a malicious cyber-hijacking of a civilian air-
craft. Universal jurisdiction could help overcome the issues that
could arise if a treaty party refuses to comply with its extradition
or prosecution obligations. Additionally, universal jurisdiction
could also hold states accountable even if they are not parties to
the Beijing Convention or they have no extradition treaties. For
example, if a cyber-Lockerbie incident occurred and a responsi-
ble host nation refused to extradite its nationals to the victim
state, a third-party state that has no relation to the terrorist at-
tack could issue an extradition request under universal jurisdic-
tion and on behalf of the victim state. If this third-party state has
adequate financial sway or influence over the nation hosting the
cybercriminals, it could incentivize the host nation to extradite
its nationals. Allowing a third-party state to request extradition
of a cybercriminal could also “provide a more neutral ground
for prosecuting terrorists” because the third-party state may have
less bias since it is neither the victim state nor the host state of
the perpetrator.243
By adopting universal jurisdiction to apply to malicious cyber-
attacks targeting the civil aviation community, aviation
lawmakers and the global community could better hold cyber-
criminals accountable for their crimes and thus help secure “in-
ternational peace and security.”244 ICAO and the aviation global
community should consider adopting universal jurisdiction as
an enforcement mechanism to hold cyberterrorists and poten-
tial safe haven host nations accountable. However, such a solu-
tion is not without its controversies. The next section will discuss
the history of universal jurisdiction, its controversies, and then
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propose some arguments in favor of expanding universal
jurisdiction.
IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
A. WHAT IS UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION?
While not uniformly defined, universal jurisdiction is gener-
ally understood as the principle that allows any nation to exer-
cise jurisdiction and prosecute alleged international criminals
for acts committed outside that state’s territory, regardless of
whether or not the prosecuting nation has any connection with
the offense.245 Other scholars define universal jurisdiction as the
“principle that certain crimes are so heinous, and so universally
recognized and abhorred, that a state is entitled or even obliged
to undertake legal proceedings without regard to where the
crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrators or
the victims.”246
Universal jurisdiction stems largely from customary interna-
tional law—the set of rules or norms that impacts every state and
obligates all nations.247 While universal jurisdiction is not ac-
cepted for most international crimes, nations commonly apply
universal jurisdiction to combat piracy on the high seas.248 In
the seventeenth century, any nation could try and execute pi-
rates caught on the high seas, regardless of the nationality of the
vessel the pirate chose to attack or the original nationality of the
pirates.249 Universal jurisdiction played an important role in
helping the international community deter and prosecute
piracy, because traditional theories of jurisdiction often failed to
hold pirates accountable for their acts.250
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Before a state can prosecute an individual, it requires jurisdic-
tion to prescribe, meaning it must have the authority to “make
its substantive laws applicable to particular persons and circum-
stances.”251 This prescriptive jurisdiction must be based on at
least one of the following grounds: (1) the perpetrator commit-
ted the crime within the nation’s territory (the Territoriality
Principle);252 (2) the crime was committed by one of the state’s
nationals (the Nationality Principle);253 (3) the crime was com-
mitted outside of the state’s territory, but one of the state’s na-
tionals was injured by the crime (the Passive Personality
Principle);254 or (4) the crime was committed outside the state’s
territory, but the crime threatens the state’s security (the Protec-
tive Principle).255 With piracy and other crimes committed on
the high seas, nations cannot claim jurisdiction based on the
territorial principle because the high seas are considered to be
part of the shared “global commons” and fall outside any na-
tion’s territory.256 Consequently, a state can only claim jurisdic-
tion over a crime committed on the high seas if the crime
involves the state’s citizens (whether as the criminal or the vic-
tim) or the crime involves one of the state’s vessels.257
However, piracy often complicated traditional theories of ju-
risdiction, because pirates typically claimed to be unaffiliated
with any nation.258 While a nation could claim jurisdiction on
behalf of piratical acts against its citizens or vessels, not all states
enjoyed the enforcement power necessary to effectively prose-
cute the pirates.259 Without effective prosecution, pirates on the
high seas would continue undeterred with their piratical acts.260
Because all nations valued the safety of the high seas as a shared
global commons, the global community made an exception to
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the typical jurisdiction rules and allowed any state to exercise
jurisdiction and prosecute pirates.261
For the most part, piracy remains one of the only crimes most
nations agree warrants the application of universal jurisdic-
tion.262 However, during the twentieth century and after the end
of World War II, the world community began to apply universal
jurisdiction to particularly “heinous” crimes that were globally
condemned, including genocide and other crimes against hu-
manity.263 In light of the Nazi atrocities committed during the
Holocaust, the international legal community asserted that ge-
nocide is so universally condemned that it should enjoy the sta-
tus of jus cogens in international law.264 Jus cogens refers to rules
of international law that are so universally accepted, that no
state may derogate from or refuse to abide by these norms.265
The concept of jus cogens became much more accepted for hei-
nous crimes in response to war atrocities during World War
II.266 However, aside from the expansion of universal jurisdic-
tion during the Nuremberg trials and a few other notable exam-
ples, many nations consider universal jurisdiction highly
controversial and refuse to expand universal jurisdiction to ap-
ply to other international crimes or even universally condemned
acts.267
Aside from the notable exceptions,268 nations resist applying
universal jurisdiction to crimes other than piracy because exer-
cising universal jurisdiction encroaches on the sovereignty of
other states.269 Additionally, many nations and legal scholars
view universal jurisdiction as a potential slippery slope that
could easily lead to abuse and could involve courts in highly po-
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268 Universal jurisdiction was invoked to extradite the former Chilean head of
state, General Augusto Pinochet. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001). Additionally, universal
jurisdiction enabled Israel to convict Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann for his
crimes during the Holocaust. Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction,
80:5 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 150 (Sept./Oct. 2001), available at http://www.foreignaf
fairs.com/articles/57245/kenneth-roth/the-case-for-universal-jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/K48A-UT7V].
269 Cade, supra note 24, at 1158.
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litical cases for which judges have no familiarity or precedent.270
While these concerns are valid, the purpose of this Article is to
suggest a limited application of universal jurisdiction to cases
involving cyber hacking or hijacking of commercial aircraft.271
To support this contention and address the concerns surround-
ing universal jurisdiction, the following section will examine
other scholarly arguments made in favor of expanding universal
jurisdiction to aircraft hijacking and cyberterrorism.
B. SCHOLARLY ARGUMENTS FOR APPLYING
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
When arguing in favor of applying universal jurisdiction to
certain international crimes, scholars often take two ap-
proaches: (1) analogizing the specific crime to piracy and then
arguing that the analogous crime also warrants the application
of universal jurisdiction; or (2) arguing that the “heinousness”
of the crime is severe enough that it would warrant the applica-
tion of universal jurisdiction under jus cogens.272 This section will
examine both of these arguments.
1. Piracy Analogies
Because this Article addresses the threats of cyber hacking or
hijacking of commercial aircraft and other critical areas of avia-
tion infrastructure, this section will focus on piracy analogies
made by scholars in the context of aircraft hijacking as well as
cyberterrorism.
a. Aircraft Hijacking
Scholars have argued that universal jurisdiction should apply
to aircraft hijacking because it equates to “aerial piracy” and can
be analogized to piracy on the high seas.273 Additionally, schol-
ars argue that such an expansion of jurisdiction would allow the
world community to prosecute hijackers while also providing a
270 See Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial Reluctance: A New “Four-
teen Points”, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION
OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 240, 240–57 (2001).
271 Anything more than that is beyond the scope of this Article.
272 See generally Peter M. Jacobson, From Piracy on the High Seas to Piracy in the
High Skies: A Study of Aircraft Hijacking, 5 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 161 (1972); Cade,
supra note 24.
273 Jacobson, supra note 272, at 161.
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significant deterrence mechanism against the menace of aircraft
hijacking.274
Just as ships in the seventeenth century traveled on the shared
global commons of the high seas, modern-day aircraft travel
through the global commons of airspace when cruising above
international waters.275 During the seventeenth century, the
global community shared an interest in ensuring the safety of
the high seas because international commerce depended on
ships to carry goods and people to and from various nations.276
To preserve international commerce and the global commons,
all nations could apprehend and prosecute pirates that
threatened the safety of the high seas.277 That same rationale
also justifies expanding universal jurisdiction to protect interna-
tional airspace in the twenty-first century.278 Today, the global
community values the safety of international airspace just as
much, if not more so, than the safety of the high seas.279 Air
cargo currently “represents more than 35% of global trade by
value.”280 Because air travel enables much of our modern global
commerce, just a single disruption in the aviation community
can cause major global economic damage.281 For example, when
a volcano erupted in Iceland in 2010, the ash that spread from
the eruption caused serious flight restrictions worldwide, lead-
ing to a $4.7 billion impact on the global GDP.282 Accordingly,
because the global community relies on air-freight and cargo to
supply the world with goods, food, and medical care, the “case
for granting universal jurisdiction over hijacking is today as com-
pelling as the case for granting similar jurisdiction over piracy
on the high seas.”283
However, critics of applying universal jurisdiction to aircraft
hijacking may argue that aviation treaties already supply enough
jurisdictional grounds to multiple nations and that the ability of
multiple nations to claim jurisdiction increases the likelihood
274 Id.
275 Id. at 165.
276 Cade, supra note 24, at 1159.
277 Id.
278 Jacobson, supra note 272, at 165.
279 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 5.
280 INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASS’N, IATA CARGO STRATEGY 3 (Feb. 2018), https://
www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/Documents/cargo-strategy.pdf [https://perma
.cc/X2QZ-2KWU].
281 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 5.
282 Id.
283 Jacobson, supra note 272, at 175.
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that at least one nation will be able to effectively prosecute and
deter an aircraft hijacker. While the state of registry of the air-
craft and an attack above a nation’s sovereign territory provide
multiple bases for jurisdiction, the same obstacles that pre-
vented victim nations from prosecuting pirates back in the sev-
enteenth century can also prevent a nation in our current age
from successfully prosecuting a cyber-hijacker operating re-
motely. For example, during the seventeenth century, some na-
tions lacked the naval forces or manpower necessary to
successfully apprehend pirates and then prosecute them.284
However, the global community resolved this issue by allowing
any other nation to step in and use its own naval force or ships
to arrest and then prosecute pirates.285 In our current age, a
nation may lack the technological means to trace a cyber-hi-
jacker to the alleged perpetrator’s host nation.286 While a
friendly neighbor nation could help the victim nation by using
its technology to identify the cyber-hijacker’s location, current
treaties only allow the victim nation or any nation with custody
of the hijacker to extradite or prosecute the alleged criminal.287
A friendly neighbor nation that has the technology needed to
trace the cyber-hijacker might also have more influence or sway
over nations harboring a cyberterrorist. Additionally, the nation
with the technological capabilities to trace the cyber-hijacker is
also arguably more prepared to put on evidence during a prose-
cution. Applying universal jurisdiction to allow any nation to
prosecute or request extradition of a cyber-hijacker would en-
able these friendly nations to hold cyber-hijackers accountable
and reduce the likelihood that cyberterrorists will remain un-
deterred. While some may argue that the victim nation is more
entitled to claim prosecutorial jurisdiction over a cybercriminal,
victim nations may prefer for friendly nations to prosecute on
behalf of the victim nation. This is especially likely if the victim
nation knows that the friendly nation has more influence over
other nations as well as the technological evidence needed to
successfully prosecute the cyber-hijacker.
284 See Cade, supra note 24, at 1159.
285 Id.
286 Alison DeNisco Rayome, UN Report: 50% of Countries Have No Cybersecurity
Strategy in Place, TECHREPUBLIC (July 6, 2017), https://www.techrepublic.com/arti
cle/un-report-50-of-countries-have-no-cybersecurity-strategy-in-place/ [https://
perma.cc/9KPN-PTUA]; Cade, supra note 24, at 1150.
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Allowing universal jurisdiction to apply against cyber-hijackers
could also prove helpful in the event that the nation hosting the
cyber-hijacker is unable to prosecute or extradite because it is in
“a state of war or internal turmoil.”288 Even if a host nation of a
cyber-hijacker wishes to bring the alleged cybercriminal to jus-
tice, it may not always be capable of doing so and universal juris-
diction could allow another nation to initiate prosecution
instead.289 For example, after the Bosnian genocide occurred in
the former Yugoslavia, Austria asserted universal jurisdiction
over an alleged defendant for complicity in the genocidal
acts.290 Though Bosnia was arguably the state most entitled to
claim prosecutorial jurisdiction over the acts, the Bosnian gov-
ernment and judicial system was unable to take any judicial ac-
tion due to “its then-ongoing internal conflict.”291 Thus, even
though Austria could not claim any prescriptive jurisdiction
based on territoriality or another principle, it successfully
claimed jurisdiction over the defendant using universal jurisdic-
tion.292 Though not an example of universal jurisdiction for
piracy or hijacking, the same principles can apply if a nation is
unable to prosecute a cyber-hijacker because of internal turmoil
or conflict. The Austrian example demonstrates how universal
jurisdiction enables the global community to keep international
criminals accountable and also deter wrongful actors.
However, critics of universal jurisdiction would likely argue
that aircraft hijacking and piracy are not perfectly analogous.
For example, the United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as any act of illegal violence or
detention on a private ship or aircraft but requires that this act
be committed for “private ends.”293 If a hijacker’s motivation
stems primarily from political or religious motives rather than
personal or financial reasons, the hijacking does not satisfy the
“private ends” definition requirement of piracy.294 However,
scholars acknowledge that modern-day pirates on the high seas
are typically “terrorists and hijackers who act for political rea-
288 Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling
Over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 537, 552 (2005).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 553.
291 Id.
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293 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
294 Jacobson, supra note 272, at 168.
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sons”295 and that the “private ends” requirement should be mod-
ified to reflect contemporary needs and realities.296
Additionally, critics would likely argue that piracy is limited to
acts of violence over or on the high seas, so aircraft hijacking
cannot qualify as “piracy” if the hijacking occurs while the plane
is flying over a nation’s territory.297 While UNCLOS does restrict
piracy to acts occurring over the high seas, scholars acknowl-
edge that the law of piracy is blurry and the definition of piracy
has been inconsistent throughout history.298 Rather than re-
stricting universal jurisdiction from applying to aircraft hi-
jacking because of piracy’s “doctrinal controversies,” scholars
suggest that an aviation convention granting limited universal
jurisdiction in respect to hijacking could help deter additional
aircraft hijackings.299
b. Cyberterrorism
When arguing that universal jurisdiction should expand to ap-
ply to cyberterrorist acts, scholars have noted that the
“borderless and transnational nature of the Internet and
cyberterrorism complicates the [traditional] application of terri-
torial jurisdiction” to international crimes.300 While a cyberter-
rorist must access the internet from a discrete location
somewhere in the world, tools like the Onion Router can mask
the cyberterrorist’s true location, making it difficult to trace the
cyberterrorist to the correct nation.301 Additionally, even if a
cyberterrorist is successfully traced to his or her location in a
country, as previously noted, it could be difficult to prosecute
that cyberterrorist if the host nation is either unwilling or una-
ble to extradite or prosecute the cyberterrorist domestically.
295 Randall, supra note 257, at 797. For example, in 1985, Palestinian terrorists
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To overcome these limitations, scholars argue that universal
jurisdiction is the most effective way to deter would-be cyberter-
rorists from attacking critical infrastructure systems.302 Universal
jurisdiction would allow victim nations to overcome the practical
challenges of locating and then prosecuting cyberterrorists be-
cause it would allow any other nation to also request that the
host nation extradite the cyberterrorist. Additionally, a different
nation could initiate its own prosecution of the cyberterrorist if
it successfully gains custody of the cyberterrorist. Applying uni-
versal jurisdiction to allow all nations to arrest and prosecute
cyberterrorists could potentially strip cybercriminals of “data”
safe havens.303 Without universal jurisdiction, an attacked state
may be forced to potentially wait for a cyberterrorist to either
voluntarily enter the attacked country or for a friendly country
to extradite the cyberterrorist to the attacked state before the
victim nation can attempt to prosecute the cyberterrorist.304
However, convenience and deterrence may not prove enough
for the global community to accept an additional application of
universal jurisdiction for cyberterrorism. To overcome this resis-
tance, scholars also argue that cyberterrorism is analogous to
piracy on the high seas, a crime for which the world has tradi-
tionally allowed any nation to prosecute.305 Scholars note that
cyberterrorism is often conducted by hackers who act individu-
ally or within hacking groups.306 Typically, these hackers act
without state consent.307 Similar to pirates on the high seas,
cyberterrorists are often unaffiliated with any nation and refuse
to abide by the laws of any nation or even society.308 Because
these cyberterrorists refuse to abide by the laws of nations and
their cyber activities can seriously threaten any nation’s critical
infrastructure, universal jurisdiction should be applied to en-
courage all nations to apprehend and prosecute cyberterrorists.
For example, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda or ISIS
have started to use cyberspace to expand their influence in re-
cent years.309 These terrorist groups resemble pirates who have
302 Gable, supra note 298, at 57.
303 Cade, supra note 24, at 1155.
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“opted out of the ‘law of society’” by potentially targeting the
entire world and abandoning their allegiance to any state.310
While it is uncertain whether Al Qaeda or ISIS have sophisti-
cated hacking skills, it is very possible that these terrorist organi-
zations might try to employ cyberhackers to conduct
cyberterrorist attacks for them.311 If ISIS partnered with a
cyberhacker group, they could attempt to conduct a cyber-9/11
or cyber-Lockerbie incident. To help deter hackers from partici-
pating in such an event, universal jurisdiction should be ex-
panded to apply to terrorists and cyberhackers that take part in
terrorist activities.
2. Examining the “Heinousness” of the Act
The second, and more difficult, argument for applying uni-
versal jurisdiction to an international crime involves persuading
the international community that the crime committed is so hei-
nous that it is on par with other crimes that have qualified for
universal jurisdiction—for example, genocide and other crimes
against humanity.312 However, the meaning of the term heinous
is defined in vague terms, such as a crime “shocking to the con-
science,” making it challenging to determine which crimes qual-
ify for universal jurisdiction.313
Because it is difficult to determine which crimes qualify as
“heinous” and should be afforded the status of jus cogens under
international law, the amount of crimes that qualify for universal
jurisdiction have been restricted.314 However, a cyber-hijacking
act could very likely qualify as heinous. Aircraft hijacking poses a
grave threat to all nations and the events of 9/11 were largely
condemned by the global community.315 In the context of
cyberterrorist acts, scholars argue that extreme acts of terrorism
that are of such a scale that entire financial or national security
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systems may be dismantled may meet this standard.316 Accord-
ingly, if acts of cyberterrorism or hijacking aircraft qualify as
“heinous” and “shocking to the conscience,” the combination of
these two crimes during a cyber-9/11 or cyber-Lockerbie inci-
dent would very likely meet the heinous standard and subse-
quently qualify for universal jurisdiction.
While a cyber-9/11 or Lockerbie would likely qualify as “hei-
nous” and aircraft hijacking is almost universally condemned,
crimes such as aircraft hijacking have not yet reached an ac-
cepted status under customary law to be governed by universal
jurisdiction.317 Additionally, malicious cyber activities targeting
areas of aviation infrastructure that do not explicitly hijack the
airplane’s avionics or cockpit controls may prove more subtle
and difficult to trace, especially if the cyberattack does not result
in a crash, injuries, or death.318 These subtler cyberattacks on
the aviation industry may fall short of the “conscience-shocking”
heinous standard and consequently fail to justify the use of uni-
versal jurisdiction.319
However, as previously noted, subtle cyberattacks on the avia-
tion industry still lead to huge financial losses and potentially
devastating impacts on the global economy.320 A cyberterrorist
would not need to necessarily hack and hijack an airplane to
have a deadly impact.321 Though more attenuated, a smaller
cyberattack that disrupts flight operations can still have deadly
consequences if it prevents a plane from delivering valuable
medical supplies or food to dependent nations or individuals.322
For example, certain remote portions of Alaska do not have
highways or roads that connect the towns to the rest of the state,
forcing citizens of these remote areas to rely on air-freight to
deliver food, medical supplies, and to transport citizens to and
from these regions.323 If airlines are unable to operate and de-
liver to these remote areas, populations could be forced to up-
root or face extinction. While these examples are extreme, they
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demonstrate how much the global community depends on avia-
tion. If considered in the aggregate, the destabilizing impact of
smaller cyberattacks could still lead to heinous results that might
warrant the application of universal jurisdiction.
Extending universal jurisdiction to apply to malicious cyberat-
tacks on the aviation industry could provide the global commu-
nity with a greater ability to prosecute cyberterrorists and send a
message that cyberterrorists will be held accountable in the
event of a cyber-Lockerbie or 9/11. Just as the international le-
gal community took a stand against genocide after World War
II, the international community today should also take a stand
against cyberterrorists by applying universal jurisdiction to hold
these terrorists accountable. While many nations bear valid con-
cerns about potential universal jurisdiction abuses, the global
aviation community’s concern with protecting the international
skies and the well-being of the global population must take pre-
cedent over these controversies. If the global community is un-
willing to adopt universal jurisdiction for cyberattacks on the
aviation industry, then the global community must also bear the
responsibility for a potential cyber catastrophe in aviation. Ulti-
mately, the global aviation industry as well as aviation lawmakers
must implement some type of standard or best practice to
strengthen cybersecurity in aviation.
V. CONCLUSION
Malicious cyber actors will continue to take advantage of tech-
nological vulnerabilities in the aviation industry. No matter their
motivation or purpose, cyber actors will continue to wage so-
phisticated cyberattacks against the aviation industry while en-
joying the anonymity and convenience of the internet. Aviation
lawmakers and organizations, and the world’s nations must im-
plement international standards that deter cyberattacks and
hold cyber actors accountable for their actions. Specifically, in-
ternational aviation lawmakers should consider expanding uni-
versal jurisdiction to apply to malicious cyber activities targeting
the world’s airlines and industry. Regardless of the deterrent
mechanism, the global aviation industry as well as aviation
lawmakers must adapt and strengthen international cyber-
security standards and practices.
48 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
APPENDIX
FIGURE 1: NextGen System324
324 Hackable at Any Height, supra note 29, at 12, figs. 1 & 2.
2019] PREVENTING A CYBER-9/11 49
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